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Executive Summary
Legislation on financial services modernization has
taken on special urgency since the banking industry is tran-
sforming itself through mergers stretching across finan-
cial services and across countries.  Phil Gramm (R-Tex.),
the new chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, has made
bank reg-ulatory reform his "number-one priority."  A review
of his-torical and contemporary evidence shows how market
forces can address concerns about consumer protection and
the soun-dness of the financial system.  The financial ser-
vices mod-ernization legislation thus should
• repeal the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act and reform the 
1956 Bank Holding Company Act, 
• allow banks to structure their new activities through 
operating subsidiaries or affiliates, 
• reduce the "moral hazard" of federal deposit insur-
ance by mimicking private bond covenants, and
• not raise any new regulatory barriers.
No. 45                                                                                              March 12, 1999
Cato Institute  • 1000 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.  • ashington, D.C. 20001  • (202) 842-0200
BANK REGULATION
Will Regulators
Catch Up with the Market?
by Randall S. Kroszner
Introduction
The regulation of financial institutions has important
consequences for the efficiency and performance of the fi-
nancial system and the economy as a whole.  Banks play a key
role in encouraging and gathering the savings that finance a
country's economic growth.  By monitoring the use of the
savings they lend to enterprises, banks are an integral part
of the corporate governance system that ultimately affects
the productivity of resources throughout the economy.
Although competition is the traditional means of
achieving efficiency in any sector of the economy, banking
is one of the most heavily regulated industries in the Unit-
ed States.  Most rationales for bank regulation fall into
two broad categories: (1) consumer protection, which con-
cerns potential conflicts of interest when a bank has multi-
ple roles, and (2) safety and soundness, which concerns the
possibility of bank panics and financial instability.  It is
imperative that the regulatory system that has governed
banking with little change since the 1930s be modernized. 
Each Congress for the past dozen years has made a major at-
tempt to revise our Depression-era banking regulations,
whose overhaul is long overdue.  Each attempt at fundamental
reform has failed.  Most recently, the House of Representa-
tives of the 105th Congress voted for the first time in fa-
vor of a bill (H.R. 10) that would end those Depression-era
regulations, but the Senate never voted on the measure.  As
the proposed merger between Citibank and the Travelers Group
clearly illustrates, the markets simply cannot wait any
longer for legislative reform and are taking deregulation
into their own hands.
While reform of financial services regulation is ex-
tremely complex, the general direction of reform is clear.
The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 and the Bank Holding Company
Act of 1956 should be altered fundamentally to permit com-
____________________________________________________________
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mercial banks to engage in a wide variety of financial serv-
ices and to permit other financial services firms to engage
in commercial banking.  The artificial walls separating
those activities should be eliminated.  Those changes are
necessary to provide greater convenience for the consumer as
well as to keep financial institutions in the United States
globally competitive.  As Table 1 shows, banks in the United
States have faced increasing competition from other finan-
cial institutions over time, and their market share has been
declining.  That share went from 62.9 percent of total as-
sets of financial institutions in 1900 to 55.9 percent in
1948 and to 25.4 percent in 1993. 
Permitting commercial banking and investment banking
under one roof, however, does raise important questions
about potential conflicts of interest and about the stabili-
ty and soundness of the financial system.  Competitive mar-
ket forces and incentives can address those issues if  the
institutions are sufficiently capitalized.  To survive in
the marketplace, a commercial bank must be able to develop a
reputation for fair and honest dealing with its customers;
otherwise, customers will turn elsewhere.  Pre-Glass- Stea-
gall evidence shows how banks successfully re solved the con-
flict-of-interest issue and provides insights into how mar-
ket forces would shape the involvement of com mercial banks
in other financial activities.  Banks appear to have volun-
tarily developed effective "firewall" struc tures that pro-
vide lessons for the current debate about the appropriate
structure of activities in a financial services firm.
The recent mergers of such banking organizations as
Bank of America-NationsBank and Banc One-First Chicago are
part of a broader trend toward consolidation and rational-
ization of the structure of the U.S. banking system.  During
the past quarter century, states have been eliminating arti-
ficial barriers to the geographic expansion of banks.  That
regulatory reform culminated at the national level with the
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act
that went into effect in June 1997 and will now allow the
markets to create truly nationwide banks.  Those mergers are
helping to create efficient and convenient interstate bank-
ing networks that would have arisen 30 years ago if the
United States had not severely restricted bank branching. 
Geographic and product-line diversification can provide
greater  stability to the financial system and enhance its
effi ciency and convenience for consumers.  Contrary to the
concerns of  many consumer and community advocates, it is the
traditional U.S. system, fragmented both along product lines
and geographically, that is fundamentally anti-consumer. 
The transformation of the banking industry--illustrated by
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the recent proposed mergers--is good for consumers and for
the economy as a whole.
Potential Conflicts of Interest in Universal Banking
Whether commercial banks should be permitted to be in-
volved in investment banking and act as "universal banks"
has been hotly debated in the United States throughout most
of the 20th centu ry. 1  Following World War I, commercial
banks became increasingly involved in the underwriting of
securities.  The Glass- Steagall Act of 1933 halted that evo-
lution by forcing commercial banks to end their corporate
securities operations, a separation that was further codi-
fied in the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. 2
One of the major motivations for the separation of com-
mercial and investment banking both in the 1930s and today
is con cern about the  poten tial for "conflicts of inter est": 3
will the public be harmed by commercial banks' en gaging in
in vestment banking?  Banks might abuse the trust of their
customers and take advantage of them by selling them low-
quali ty securities without fully r eveal ing the risks, and
such behavior could broadly undermine confi dence in the
markets and banks themselves. 4  Because of the often long-
term len ding relationship between a bank and a client firm,
banks may be better informed than the individual in vestor
about a cli ent firm's soundness and prospects.  That infor-
mational ad vantage, however, can be a double-edged sword. 
On the positive side, given its detailed knowledge of
the firm, a commercial bank might be better positioned than
an in vestment bank to provide information to prospective
purchasers of the firm’s securities.  Through the lending
relationship, banks might know which firms have particularly
good prospects and might be able to help them to bring their
securities to the public mar kets earlier than would be the
case if the young firms had to try to start new relation-
ships with investment banks.  In other words, commercial
banks may enjoy a synergy in combining lending with under-
writing that could make them more efficient than inde pendent
investment banks at monitoring and evaluating firms and se-
curities. 
On the negative side, however, a commercial bank might
have an incentive to use its superior information to its own
advantage.  Commercial banks might have greater incentiv e
and greater ability to take advantage of investors than do
investment banks.  First, consider the incentives.  If the
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bank is aware of a nega tive shock to a borrowing firm's
prospects before the market is, for example, the bank may
wish to have the now-risky loan repaid.  To do so, the bank
may underwrite a public securities offering for this firm,
have the firm use the proceeds to repay the loan, but not
adequately disclose information about the firm's troubles to
the market.  An invest ment bank wit hout the prior lending
relationship would not have the same incentive.  Next, con-
sider commercial banks' access to customers.  Commercial
banks might be able to exploit their in formation advantage
more easily than could investment banks be cause deposito rs
may be more easily duped than the more sophisti cated custom-
ers of investment banks . 
The positive and negative arguments, however, are not
mutually exclusive.  Commercial banks could enjoy efficien-
cies asso ciated with combin ing lending and und erwriting but
also be sub ject to credibility problems due to the potential
for conflicts of interest.  Until recently, the commonly
held view, dating from the 1930s, was not only that there
was a potential for conflicts of interest to be important
but also that the potential was real ized and that the public
was systematically fooled by rogue bank ers.  That view be-
came the received wisdom even though there had been no sys-
tematic study of commercial bank involvement in under writing
during the period.  Historical investigation 5 is crucial
because the received wisdom continues to be a ma jor factor
in the policy debates over how Glass- Steagall reform will
affect small investors 6 and because investigation suggests
how the unregulated mar ket may address con flict-of-interest
problems if Glass- Steagall  is repealed.
To determine how investors fared before Glass- Steagall,
we can compare the performance of securities underwrit ten by
inde pendent investment banks with that of securities under-
written by commercial banks and their affiliates.  If the
commercial banks had succumbed to conflicts of interest, in-
vestors would have been lured into purchasing securities
that would have turned out to be poor investments relative
to similar securities underwritten by investment banks. 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, securities underwritten by
commercial banks performed better  than similar securities
underwritten by investment banks.  The public's wari ness of
the commercial banks appears to have made it difficult for
them to issue anything but well-known securi ties of high
quality.  Relative to the investment banks, commercial
banks, on average, tended to underwrite for larger, older,
and better es tablished firms and originate more senior
(i . e., debt rather than equity) securities.  Even before the
advent of strict disclosure requirements, the public was not
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sys tematically fooled and banks did not "abuse the public
trust" by issuing unexpectedly low-quality securities. 
Thus, the histori cal record suggests th at investors would
not be harmed by an end to Glass- Steagall and could benefit
from the convenience of one-stop shopping for financial ser-
vices.
Firewalls and Chinese Walls: What Type of Separations,
If Any, Should Be Mandated?
Firewalls have been p roposed both to mitigate potential
conflicts of interest and to prevent the extension of the
government's bank safety net beyond depositor protection. 7 
Since the late 1980s, regulators have permitted bank holding
companies to operate so-called section 20 subsidiaries with
limited involve ment in the securities markets.  Ini tially, a
maximum of 5 per cent of the subsidiaries' revenues could be
from otherwise pro hibited investment banking activities, a
revenue limit that has recently been increased to 25 per-
cent.  In addition, the subsid iaries face a variety of re-
strictions on the sharing of personnel and information with
the bank.  The exact structure of the sepa ration has been an
important part of the current debate over fi nancial modern-
ization legislation.
Again, the historical record can help to predict the
struc tures market forces would bring if Glass- Steagall re-
strictions were to end.  Prior to the Glass- Steagall Act,
banks entered the securities business in one of two ways:
through internal depart ments or sepa rate affiliates. 8  In-
ternal securities departments were organized within banks,
parallel with the banks' lending departments, much as clas-
sic German universal banks have orga nized themselves.  Af-
fil iates were separately incorpo rated and capitalized firms
with their own boards of directors and their own balance
sheets, much like section 20 subsidiaries today.
During the 1920s, there was a strong trend toward the
adoption of separate affiliates and away from the use of
internal departments.  A key motivation for that movement
appears to have been concerns about internal departments'
reputation and credi bility with inves tors.  Holding all oth-
er factors constant, in vestors rewarded separate affiliates
with higher prices for the securities they underwrote than
they did internal departments for otherwise similar securi-
ties.  Investors appear to have been con cerned that the se-
curities underwritten through the internal de partments were
riskier and so would not pay as high a price for them as for
otherwise similar securities underwritten through separate
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affili ates.  In other words, the market discounted for the
greater likelihood of conflicts of interest when lending and
underwriting were both within the bank.  Although the affil-
iate and the bank were still connected--there were common
board members--and there was no man dated firewall protection
that could be enforced by the courts, the greater transpar-
ency and arm's-length structure of the affiliate provided
some improved credibility. 
An important mechanism by which the affiliates gained
great er credibility appears to have been the use of indepen-
dent direc tors on the boards of affiliates.  Independent di-
rectors are in dividuals who are not officers or directors o f
the parent commer cial bank.  The public may perceive them as
less willing than insiders to accede to the pressure of
lending officers who might want risky loans repaid through
the sale of public securities.  A high proportion of inde-
pendent directors on the boards of affili ates did lead to
affi li ates' being able to receive higher prices for their
securities, holding all other quality factors constant.  The
market rewarded banks with more credible structures with
hig her prices.  Market pressures thu s appear to have been
the key to determining the extent of the "independence" of
the subsidiaries' boards and the extent of the firewall sep-
arations.
Competitive market forces appear to propel banks to
adopt the structure that regula tors would like to  mandate. 
The legal requirements of a regulation-mandated firewall
str ucture, howev er, are likely to be insufficiently flexible
to allow banks to adapt to ongo ing changes in the financial
services market.  In addition, a specific regulatory mandate
does not permit the mar kets to explore a rich diversity of
organizational forms and com mitment devices that could ef-
fectively address conflict-of-inter est issues at the lowest
cost. 
The evidence from the recent studies of the pre-Glass-
Steagall  involvement of commer cial banks in investment bank-
ing sup ports the repeal of Glass- Steagall.  Contrary to the
concerns of the act's defenders, investors were not system-
atically fooled by commercial banks and did not suffer loss-
es.  Investor concerns about the credibility of commercial
banks as underwriters led the banks to focus on higher grade
and better known securities.  Wit hout regulatory pressure,
commercial banks adopted some form of separation between
their lending and underwriting operations con sistent with
addressing investor concerns about their credibili ty.  To -
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day, however, deposit insurance and the federal safety net
are important factors to con sider.
Stability and the Safety Net
An important argument made for bank regulation and, in
par ticular, against broadening bank powers concerns the sta-
bility of the banking system. 9  In a system without gov ern-
ment guarantees or distortions, private owners of any enter-
prise have the appro priate in centives to choose the capital
structure that permits the (privately) "optimal" amount of
stability.  The owners and managers of each enter prise de-
cide the degree of risk of loss they will tolerate for a
given expected level of return.
The optimal amount of stability in any industry, in-
cluding the financial system, does not imply zero failures.
Firms will enter and leave any healthy and dynamic competi-
tive sector.  Com petition ensures efficiency through a win-
nowing process that eli minates firms that have poor manage-
ment or experience bad luck.
In the financial sector, however, stability is widely
perceived to be a distinct pub lic concern because of a fear
that the owners of individual institutions will not take
into account the possibility that a failure of one institu-
tion might cause fail ures else where.  Such linkages could
lead to a systemwide finan cial panic or "meltdown," which in
turn might cause a broader macroeconomic decline.  Bank own-
ers may not take this adverse externality into account in
pricing risk and determining the ap propriate amount of pri-
vate capital to invest.  The socially op timal capital ratio
thus may be greater than the pri vately opti mal one.  Since
the benefits of systemwide stability accrue to all economic
agents, not just banks, it may not be appropriate to have
only the bank shareholders bear its cost.
This potential negative externality provides the justi-
fica tion for government inter vention to provide a "safety
net."  Banks are viewed as more fragile than other firms
mainly because of two features of a typical bank's financial
structure .  First, banks and financial institutions tend to
be highly leveraged; that is, they have a low capital-to-
assets ratio compared with nonfinancial firms.  Consequent-
ly, their cushion against insol vency is thinner than that of
nonfinancial firms.
Second, banks tend to hold a low ratio of liquid assets
rel ative to their highly liq uid liabili ties.  Because they
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provide demand and other short-term de posits on a fraction al
reserve ba sis, banks have a m uch gre ater liquidity and dura-
tion mismatch between assets and lia bilities than do nonfi-
nancial firms.  That mismatch makes banks particularly sen-
sitive to sudden large with drawals of funds (bank runs) that
cannot be met in full and on time by the banks' cash and
liquid asset holdings. 10  Banks thus may be required to sell
assets quickly.  To the extent that those assets are not
traded in highly liquid markets, the banks may suffer fire-
sale losses that may exceed their small capital base and
drive them into insolvency.  The duration mismatch also ex-
poses banks to interest rate risk so that abrupt changes in
in terest rates can induce (realized and unrealized) loss es
that can quickly exceed their capital.
Such concerns about bank instability have p rovided a
ratio nale for restricting the types of assets that a bank
can hold in its portfolio.  Part of the rationale for main -
t aining  the Glass- Steagall Act is to shield banks from expo-
sure to many types of risks, particularly those of holding
equity instruments.  Some people have gone further to argue
for even greater restrictions on bank assets and bank activ-
ities.  Some "narrow bank" pro posals, for example, would re-
quire banks to hold 100 percent re serves of liquid, short-
term government bonds to address and rem edy the two main
causes of individual bank fragil ity just dis cussed. 11
In addition to concerns about the stability of individ-
ual banks, there is concern that the banking system is par-
ticularly fragile because of the close interconnectedness of
banks through interbank deposits and lending.  Losses at any
one bank may thus produce losses at other banks, which can
cascade throughout the banking system.  Moreover, if de posi-
tors are unable to differen tiate among the financial health
of individual banks, trou bles at one or a few institutions
could spread quickly throughout the system as uninformed
depositors withdraw funds indiscriminately from depository
institutions regardless of their financial funda mentals.  In
the absence of offsetting actions by the central bank, such
runs from deposits at banks will worsen fire-sale los ses,
increase the number of bank failures, and cause a multiple
contraction of money and credit and macroeconomic in-
stabil i ty .
The fragility of banks and  the banking system in the
absence of a government safety net, however, may be overem-
phasized.  First, bank failures spread throughout the system
only if losses exceed a bank's capital by enough to produce
losses at creditor banks that exceed their capital and, in
turn, force them into insolvency.  If losses associated with
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individual insolvencies could be minimized, the likelihood
of contagion or systemic risk would be greatly reduced.  As
discussed below, delays that have permitted financial insti-
tutions to become deeply insolvent be fore closure are pri-
marily due to regulatory, not market, fail ure. 12
Second, before the introduction of the lender of last
resort in the United States, the failure rate of banks was
actually low er than that of nonfinancial firms, and losses
to depositors and other bank creditors were lower than to
creditors of nonfinancial firms. 13  In addition, U.S. banks
held higher capital-to-asset ratios prior to safety net reg-
ulations.  Recent international experiences suggest that
banks substitute government deposit in surance or public cap-
ital for private capital. 14  Again, the safe ty net may have
made banks more, not less, fragile.
Third, Charles Calomiris and Joseph Mason have examined
in detail the bank panic that took place in Chicago during
June 1932. 15  Although there did seem to be some temporary
confusion about the quality of bank assets and a short-lived
general depos itor run, Calomiris  and Mason do not find any
evidence of failure of banks that were solvent at the be gin-
ning of the panic.  The runs were directed primarily against
the weakest banks, which were the ones that failed.  Thus,
even during the heights of bank panics of the Great De pres-
sion, depositor runs do not appear to have generated "conta-
gion" or "systemic" prob lems that caused otherwise solvent
institutions to fail.
Fourth, historically, bankers developed innovative con-
tracts to attenuate the likeli hood of panic runs.  One exam-
ple is the "option clause" that came to be a standard provi-
sion in private bank notes circulating in Scotland during
its 18th-century "free-banking" era. 16  The option clause
gave bank directors the right to suspend specie payment for
up to six months, but the bank then promised to pay a high
rate of interest on the notes dur ing the period of suspen-
sion.  This clause allowed the banks to stop "pa nic" runs
and to have more time to adjust to negative liquidity shocks
that might occur, thereby avoiding fire-sale losses.  Al so,
banks in Scotland had some form of extended or unlimited
lia bili ty covering their notes, rather than simple limited
liabili ty.  Those notes were widely and voluntarily accept-
ed, and the Scottish banking system showed much greater sta-
bility than did the English system during this period.
Finally, there is little historical evidence that per-
mitting banks to expand their portfolios to include equity
reduces sta bility.  Eugene White shows that, during the
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1920s and 1930s, commercial banks in the United States that
actively engaged in the securities markets were less likely
to fail than were other commercial banks. 17  In addition,
banks with securities opera tions tended to have higher capi-
tal ratios and lower variance of their cash flows than did
other banks.  Involvement in the secu rities  business, thus,
appears to have helped banks to diversify and thereby en-
hanced their stability during the 1920s and 1930s.
Safety Nets and Market Discipline
Given that the concerns about t he inherent fragility of
banks and the banking system may be overstated, the next
step is to evaluate the role of the regulatory safety net
that govern ments--implicitly or explicitly--have placed un-
der their banking systems.  While, in principle, safety net
measures could increase the stability of the system, in
prac tice, it has proven difficult to design a safety net
that does not undermine both efficiency and stability. 
Improper ly designed safety nets may encourage behavior by
both the insured banks and their regulators that over time
is likely to prove far costlier than the bene fits safety
nets may gen erate.  As has been clearly demonstrated in
almost all coun tries in recent years, poorly designed and
implemented de posit insurance, for example, h as grea tly
reduced depositor discipline of banks and thereby encouraged
them to engage in mor al hazard behavior, by assuming greater
credit and inter est rate risk exposure in their asset and
liability portfo lios and by mai ntaining lower capital ra-
tios.
By short-circuiting market discipline, deposit insur-
ance also allows bank regulators to engage in regulatory
forbearance, delaying the imposition of sanctions on trou-
bled banks and per mitting even economically insolvent insti-
tutions to continue to operate.  The costs of forbearance
can be and have been very large. 18
Without government guarantees of deposits, insolvent
banks could not stay in business long.  Banks receiving low
ratings from depositors as well as independent private rat-
ing agencies would either have to compensate depositors with
higher interest rates or see funds flow out.  Withdrawals by
informed depositors might force troubled banks to sell as-
sets quickly and perhaps experience fire-sale losses.  If a
bank could no longer satisfy the depositors' demands in full
and on time, it would close (sus pend operations) either vol-
untarily or at the order of the regu lators.  In addition,
without the strong "heads I win, tails you lose" character
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of the safety net, the bank owners might have chosen a dif-
ferent initial risk profile for the bank.  As noted above,
prior to the introduction of the lender of last resort in
the United States, bank failure and loss rates were lower
than those for nonfinancial firms .
The problems of moral h azard are not associated only
with the existence of a govern ment safety net; they also
exist in many market contexts, so it is valuable to under-
stand how the market deals with such problems.  Private
markets ad dress those problems through debt covenants  that
tend to prevent, rather than provide forbearance for, exces-
sive risk tak ing. 19  Debt covenants are ex plicit provisions
in debt contracts that restrict a firm's behav ior and abili-
ty to take risks.  Banks often include such provi sions in
their own loan agreements with firms.  Covenants are trig-
gered as soon as earnings or capital fall below prespecified
levels or leverage rises above such levels.  In some cases,
covenants allow the debt holders to seize control of the
firm as the firm experiences financial distress.  Covenants
thus prevent a distressed firm from continuing to operate as
it did before and attempt to prevent it from increasing its
risk exposure.
When government deposit insurance is implicit or ex-
plicit, regulatory discipline should be structured to mimic
the way in which the market deals with the moral hazard
problem. 20  Rather than permit regulatory forbearance, the
government should require that regulators follow clearly de-
fined practices to restrict the risk-taking activities of
banks experi encing financial distress and to resolve their
problems before they become deeply insolvent.  In parallel
with private debt cov enants, intervention by regulators
could be related to capital ratios or other performance and
solvency measures.  Such regu la tory discipline would prevent
depositor (and taxpayer) losses at individual institutions
from growing and possibly causing systemwide problems.  The
Federal Deposit Insurance Cor poration Im provement Act of
1991 was a first step toward introducing explic it interven-
tion and closure rules in the United States. 21
Geographic Rationalization and Consolidation
of Banking through Mergers
Having discussed what type of internal bank structures
market forces are likely to give rise to, I f ocus now on the
likely structure of the banking industry itself as merg ers
and consoli dations continue. 22  A two-tiered banking sys tem
in which nation wide and regionwide banks coexist with small -
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er local banks is likely to emerge.  Although the num ber of
banks in the United States will continue to decline, small
banks will survive.  Con sumers will enjoy greater con ve-
nience and a greater array of op tions, and that will be true
in neighborhoods of all income cate gories.
To project how the U.S. banking system is likely to
evolve, it is useful to focus on California, which has had
unrestricted branching within the state for more than a cen-
tury.  Market forc es, rather than branching and geographic
restrictions, have been the primary determinant of the stru-
cture of banking within Cali fornia.  The large and diverse
economy of California thus can provide a good indication of
how the U.S. banking system as a whole will evolve now that
artificial barriers to branching across state lines have
been elimi nated. 23  Four hundred commer cial banks and thrift
institutions operate in the state of Cali fornia (as of June
1997).  These California banks and thrifts hold just under
one-sev enth of all U.S. deposits.  If the whole of the
United States will ultimately have the structure we see in
California today, the number of banks that is likely to ex-
ist in the long run in the United States is roughly 2,800. 
(In other words, multiply the number of institutions in Cal-
ifornia [400] by the inverse of their U.S. market share [7]
to deter mine the total number of banks.) 
Survival of Small Institutions
Since there are approximately 9,000 banks and thrifts
in the United States today, that projection implies that the
number of banks in the United States will shrink by two-
thirds.  That large reduction in the number of banks, howev-
er, does not  imply that the smaller banks are in danger of
disappearing or that there will be less competition.  First,
California provides an instruc tive example of the survival
of small banks.  Banking in Califor nia is not more concen-
trated than in other states even though there are rela tively
fewer banks there.  Bank of America, the largest bank in
California and one of the largest banks in the world, has a
market share of 21 percent of deposits in Califor nia.  The
average market share of the largest bank in each state in
the United States is 20 per cent, virtually the same as in
Cal ifornia.  If we sum the deposits held by t he 5 or 10
lar gest  banks and thrifts in each state, however, banking in
Cal ifornia is less  concen trated than in the average state. 
Small institutions have survived and will survive in the
same markets as the banking giants.
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Another place where smal l banks have survived the chal-
lenge from large banks is New York. 24  Regulatory changes in
the early 1970s permitted the large banks in New York City
to expand up state for the first time.  During the
1970s, most of the money-center banks did try to move up-
state  by opening branches and purchasing local banks.  The
small up state banks, however, proved to be tough competi-
tors.  Dur ing the 1980s, Bankers Trust and Bank of New York
di vested much of the upstate networks built in the previous
decade; Citibank also sold many of its upstate branches. 
The money-center banks gener ally have not been able to
achieve a domi nant position upstate.  A study by the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York divided all of upstate New York
into 15 markets and showed that NYC-based banks had greater
market shares than the local banks and thrifts in only 2 of
those 15 up state markets. 25  After more than 20 years, small
local banks have survived and prospered in head-to-head
competi tion with the largest banks in the country.
Concentration and Competition: Local and National
Another issue raised by the consolidation in the bank-
ing industry is how the reduc tion in the number of banks
might affect market concentration and competition.  Given
the fragmentation of the U.S. banking system due to more
than a century of strict bra nching regulation, it is very
important to distinguish between bank concentration at the
local level and at the national level.  Reducing the number
of banks in the nation could in crease  competition and reduce
concentration in local retail markets. 
To take an extreme example, assume that each state had
only one bank, and banks could not compete across state
lines.  While there would be monopoly at the state level,
measured concentra tion at the national level might not be
particularly high.  The number of banks nationally and the
national-level concentration, however, would be irrelevant
because the individual banks could  not compete with each
other.  Now assume that banks are permitted to branch and
merge across state lines.  Banks will then begin to compete
di rectly by entering each other's markets through branch ing
and mergers.  At the national level, mergers will make it
appear that the industry is becoming more concentrated, but
the effect will be the opposite at the local level.  Even if
only, say, 10 banks survive after the mergers, each local
market may have lower concentration and more consumer choice
because multi ple banks will operate in each state.
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The recent bank megamergers are primarily of the net-
work-extension type.  The merging institutions generally
have been operating in distinct markets.  Bank of America
and Nati onsBank, for example, have almost no  overlap.  First
Chicago and Banc One overlap in parts of Indiana and Illi-
nois, but a majority of their operations are distinct.  The
effect of these mergers is to cre ate stronger competitors in
each of the markets in which the two banks initially operat-
ed rather than to eliminate a competitor.
Potential and Actual Entry
Even in cases in which there might be a significant
preex isting overlap of the merg ing partners, simply counting
the number of  institutions and measuring concentration are
not suffi cient for understanding what the effects on compe-
tition will be.  If barriers to new entry are high, then
high concentration and few banks in a local market may imply
a competitive problem.  If barriers to new entry are low,
however, it will be very difficult for the incumbents to
engage in anti-competitive behavior.  If banks in a particu-
lar mar ket were enjoying monopoly profits, new banks would
then enter and compete away those pro fits. 
Sinc e one must obtain a charter from the state or fed-
eral government to operate a bank, the chartering process
could con stitute a barrier to entry.  To maintain a competi-
tive and effi cient banking environment, it is imperative to
keep such regula tory cost s low.  Regulatory reform should
ensure that regulation does not pose unnecessary obstacles
to new entry.  As evidence that such costs have not been
prohibitive, more than 1,500 cha rters have been granted dur-
ing the past decade.  During the same period, nearly 4,900
banking organizations have disappeared through failure and
merger.  The number of new char ters granted has risen stead-
ily over the last few years, and 188 were granted in 1997,
the most since 1989.  In an environment where barriers to
entry are not high, the mergers we are seeing are highly un-
likely to generate anti-competitive outcomes.
Most of the future big mergers will continue to be of
the network-extension type--expanding a banking franchise
into new markets to provide regionwide and, ultimately, tru-
ly nationwide service.  In the next 10 years, that process
will create the type of banking structure that the United
States would have developed 30 years ago if not for the
branching  restrictions.  National banking giants such as
Citig roup and Bank of America-NationsBank will then be fac-
ing off in markets throughout the country.  The small local
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banks will sur vive by providing a level of personalized and
indi vidualized ser vice that super-regional and national
banks do not.  Consumers will benefit from the battle of the
titans.
Effects on Fees
The impact of bank consolidation on prices that custom-
ers will pay has received much attention.  Consumer and com-
munity advocates have been concerned that larger banks
charge higher fees.  The Federal Reserve conducts an annual
survey of 1,000 banks around the cou ntry to determine what
fees they charge and reports the results to Congress. 26 
Consumer advocates have inter preted tables in the repo rt as
suggesting that larger institu tions may appear to charge
higher fees for some services than do smaller institutions.
That conclusion, however, is not justified by the data.
The key reason is that larger banks tend to operate in met-
ropolitan areas and smaller banks tend to operate in rural
areas.  The costs of most goods and services are higher in
cities than in the countryside.  If one adjusts for whether
the bank is located in a Standard Metropolitan Statistical
Area or not, then the differ ence between the fees charged by
large and small banks disap pears. 27  In other words, both
large and small banks in metropoli tan areas tend to charge
higher fees than large and small banks in rural areas. 
Since large banks are more likely to be located in cities
than are small banks, the fee difference appears at first
glance to be due to bank size; however, the difference is
actually due to location.  If some multistate banks should
decide to charge higher fees than are typical in the local
markets, those i nstitutions would be leaving open a market
niche that could then be filled by smaller local in stitu-
tions.
The types of mergers we are discussing also are likely
to result in lower actual fees being incurred by customers.
As is true in many lines of business, banks often give their
own customers discounts that they do not offer to noncus-
tomers.  One example is automat ic teller machine (ATM) fees,
which are often lower or zero for consumers who use their
own bank’s machines, whereas the bank will charge noncus-
tomers a higher fee for using the bank's ATM.  The megamerg-
ers are creating multistate networks of ATM machines owned
by the same bank.  A customer traveling to different cities
thus can avoid paying such fees and receive the discount
regardless of where she is.  This provides an important con-
venience to business travelers and to vacation travelers,
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since they can now deal with their home institution wherever
their travels take them and con tin ue to enjoy the discount
for using their own bank’s services.
Effects on the Availability of Services through Branches
Another issue of interest is the impact that bank con-
solida tion will have on the ava ilability of services through
branches.  As Figure 1 clearly shows, branch networks have
been growing de spite the reduction in the number of banks
during the last de cade.  Since 1985 the number of banking
organizations has de clined by nearly one-third, primarily
through mergers, to just over 9,000.  The number of bank
branches, however, has increased  by one-third, to nearly
58,000.  In addition, the number of ATMs also has risen rap-
idly to exceed 125,000 in the United States, and ATMs have
also been spreading internationally. 28  Banking by phone and
electronically has also increased.  Consumer options have
thus been increasing, not decreasing, with bank consol ida-
tion.
Consumer and community advocates raise questions about
the effect of mergers not just on the number of branches but
also on the location of branches.  Economists at the Federal
Figure 1
Bank Consolidation and Branch Networks in the United States, 1985-96
Sources: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Federal Reserve Board.
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Reserve Board have recently developed a new, comprehensive
database to use in studying the direct impact of mergers on
the growth of branches and their locations. 29  Using de-
tailed data from 1975 to 1995 that classify branches by pos-
tal ZIP codes, they find that mergers involving little over-
lap of branches in the same ZIP codes do not reduce the num-
ber of bra nches per capita. 
More striking is the finding that the effect of mergers
on branching does not  vary with average income in the ZIP
code: the impact of mergers on the number of branches per
capita in poor neighborhoods is the same as in wealthy
neig hborhoods.  That evidence is inconsistent with the con-
cern that after mergers banks tend to increase service to
rela tively affluent areas in comparison with lowe r income
ar eas.
In fact, mergers of the type we have seen recently pro-
vide consumers with far more convenience.  Customers who
have family members in different states will find that they
can now use the same bank to service all family members. 
Setting up a joint ac count for family members in different
states and transferring funds among separate family members'
accounts is much simplified.  A single phone call or visit
to the local branch will re place the process of writing a
check, mailing it, waiting for the check to arrive, depos it-
ing it, and waiting again for the check to clear.  Having a
bank with regionwide and nationwide offices can thus save
consumers both time and money.
International Context
The expansion of bank powers and banking networks
through mergers also should be con sidered in an internation-
al context.  Concerning bank powers, all of the European
Union members and G-10 countries except the United States
permit commercial banks to underwrite and deal in private
securities. 30  All but four of these countries (Belgium,
Canada, Greece, and Japan) permit banks to conduct securi-
ties activities directly; the four other coun tries require
some type of subsidiary structure, similar to the section 20
subsidiar ies that have been permitted in the United States
during the past decade.  Most developed countries thus give
banks great flexibility in choosing the type of corporate
form best suited for their involvement in the securities
busi ness.
The mergers occurring in the United States may not be
as " mega" as it might seem when they are considered in an
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interna tional  context.  Table 2 compares the structure of
the banking systems in the G-7 countries.  The United States
has far more banks per person (i.e., lower population per
bank) than any of the other major industrialized nations. 
If the number of banks in the United States were reduced to
about 2,800, then the number of banks per person would be-
come similar to the figures for France, Italy, and the Unit-
ed Kingdom but still be much greater than for Germany, Cana-
da, and Japan.  The United States also has a relatively high
number of bank offices per person (i.e., lower population
per banking office); of the G-7 nations, only Italy and Can-
ada have more bank offices per per son.
The final columns of Table 2 demonstrate the very low
level of banking concentration in the United States relative
to the other G-7 countries.  The three biggest U.S. banks
control roughly 13 per cent of all banking assets in the
United States, by far the low est concen tration in the G-7. 
The next least concentrated coun tries are Japan and the
United Kingdom, where the top three banks have market shares
more than double that for the top three banks in the United
States.  In addition, banking system assets as a fraction of
total gross domestic product are relatively low in the Unit-
ed States compared with the other industrialized countries.
 In the United States banking system assets are roughly 59
percent of GDP, which is roughly half the average of the
other six G-7 countries.  When seen in a global context,
even the largest combinations being created through the so-
called megamergers in the United States are not generating
institutions that are unusually large relative to either the
banking system or the economy as a whole.
Conclusion
We are in the midst of the transformation of the U.S.
banking system from one that is effectively unfriendly to
the consumer to one that is much less so.  Addressing finan-
cial services regulatory reform is very important to permit
an efficient and sound modernization of the U.S. banking and
financial system.  Expanding banking powers and giving banks
flexibility to choose the most appropriate firewall separa-
tions, as long as the banks and their subsidiaries have high
levels of capital, will be an important part of any reform
effort.  Market forces can be very effective in minimizing
the opportunities for conflicts of interest and avoiding any
harm to consumers.  Customers can benefit from having the
option of using financial services supermarkets if they so
choose. 
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The banking industry will continue to consolidate.  The
number of institutions will decline, but no danger to compe-
tition or service is on the horizon.  The 106th Congress
should act now to remove obstacles such as the Glass- Stea-
gall Act of 1933 and the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. 
Dismantling such barriers would allow commercial banks to
underwrite securities, offer brokerage services, expand into
merchant banking, and provide insurance.  In addition, Con-
gress should
· allow banks to have maximum flexibility to choose how
to structure those activities, through an operating
subsidiary or an affiliate in the bank holding company,
to permit the greatest scope for future innovations and
increases in consumer convenience;
· permit banks to own equity in nonfinancial firms and
thereby take a more active part in the U.S. system of
corporate governance;
· reduce the "moral hazard" of deposit insurance by
having the system mimic private bond covenants that re-
strict risk-taking behavior as a firm's capital de-
clines , building on the first steps taken in this di-
rection by the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991;
· not raise new obstacles to the rationalization and
consolidation of the banking industry and eliminate the
limit on the maximum national market share for banks;
and
· subject existing banking and financial regulations to
the same kind of rigorous cost/benefit review to which
health and safety regulations are subject.
Enacting these regulatory reforms would lift a heavy
burden from U.S. banks and make the financial services in-
dustry more competitive.  Expanding economic freedom would
both be in keeping with the Constitution and serve consum-
ers.  This is an opportunity Congress cannot afford to miss.
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